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Abstract
A notion of incentive for agents is introduced which leads to a very general notion
of an equilibrium for a finite game. Sufficient conditions for the existence of these
equilibria are given. Known existence theorems are shown to be corollaries to the main
theorem of this paper. Furthermore, conditions for the existence of equilibria in certain
symmetric regions for games are also given.
From the notion of general equilibrium, a general family of game dynamics are
derived. This family incorporates all canonical examples of game dynamics. A proof
is given for the full generality of this system.
1 Notation and Definitions
We shall denote the finite set of agents by N = {1, 2, . . . , n} for some n ∈ N. Each agent i is
endowed with a finite set of pure strategies, which will be denoted Si = {1, 2, . . . , si}, with
si ∈ N as well. To allow the agents to mix their strategies, they may choose strategies from
the simplex on si vertices,
∆i =
{
xi ∈ Rsi
∣∣∣∣∣xiα ≥ 0,∑
α
xiα = 1
}
,
which is the convex hull of Si, or equivalently the space of probability distributions over the
finite set. For simplicity we will embed Si in ∆i such that α ∈ Si 7→ eiα ∈ Rsi where eik is
the kth standard unit vector in the Euclidean space Rsi . We denote S = ×iSi and ∆ = ×i∆i
as the pure and mixed strategy spaces respectively for the game.
It is often convenient to denote the pure and mixed strategy spaces without a particular
player; S−i, and ∆−i respectively. We define S−i = ×j 6=iSj, and ∆−i = ×j 6=i∆j. Elements
in these sets can be interpreted many different ways. In particular S−i is a s−i =
|S|
si
dimensional space and we would prefer to identify elements in this space with standard
unit vectors in Rs−i as before. Unfortunately, there are s−i! ways to accomplish this. In
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practice, we will only use this identification when we will sum over all possible combinations
of pure strategies. Using a different identification will simply result in a permutation of
terms in a finite sum, which of course has no effect. k ∈ S−i is a multi-index given by
(k1, . . . , ki−1, ki+1, . . . , kn). Our embedding, given by k ∈ S−i 7→ e−iβ ∈ Rs−i , extends to ∆−i
such that x−i ∈ ∆−i =
∑
β x−iβe−iβ with x−iβ =
∏
j 6=i xjkj . If we have a single agent we will
interpret S−i, ∆−i, s−i, and x−i as S, ∆, s and x respectively.
We will also adopt a convention for replacement for part of a strategy profile, x ∈ ∆. We
write (ti, x−i) ∈ ∆ = (x1, x2, . . . , ti, . . . , xn), where the ith component of x has been replaced
by another strategy ti ∈ ∆i.
Each agent will have a utility function defined over the set of all possible combinations
of pure strategies S. We will denote this utility
ui : S → R.
These utility functions have unique n-linear extensions to ∆ given by
ui(x) =
∑
α
xiαui(eiα, x−i) = xTi Aix−i,
where aiαβ = ui(eiα, e−iβ) and Ai = {aiαβ}. We will simply refer to these extensions as the
utility functions from now on.
2 Game Equilibrium
The Nash equilibrium [Nas50] is ubiquitous throughout game theory. The rise of evolu-
tionary game theory has put new emphasis on dynamics of rationality as opposed to static
equilibrium concepts. Most of these dynamic models are focused on either the Nash equi-
librium itself or some refinement of the Nash equilibrium, eg. evolutionary stable strategies
(ESS) [S+74], -equilibrium [Eve57], etc. However, the question of applicability of the Nash
equilibrium to actual human actors is still open. Often, in practice, the Nash equilibrium
does not approximate actual behavior in a given game; see Prisoner’s Dilemma [RC65] or
Traveler’s Dilemma [Bas94, Bas07] for instance.
We open up the interpretation of an equilibrium by first generalizing the notion of incen-
tive for an agent. In the sequel we will derive from this interpretation a family of differential
equations that can account for different updating procedures used by agents. First however,
we will show there exists equilibrium in games with general incentives requiring minimal
conditions.
2.1 Incentive Equilibrium
We begin the treatment of general equilibrium by starting with Nash’s second proof of
existence in finite games [Nas51].
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Definition 1. A strategy profile x ∈ ∆ is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
ui(x) = max
t∈∆i
ui(t, x−i), ∀i.
We may simplify this definition by further linearly extending the utility functions to all
of Rm, where m =
∏
i si. This results in m-linear functions which are harmonic on all of Rm.
We may therefore invoke the maximum principle on the closed convex space ∆ recursively
to deduce that the ui’s are maximized (and minimized) in S. Therefore,
max
t∈∆i
ui(t, x−i) = max
α
ui(eiα, x−i),
and thus we can give an equivalent definition for the Nash equilibrium as follows:
Definition 2. A strategy profile x ∈ ∆ is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
ui(x) = max
α
ui(eiα, x−i), ∀i.
Thus it was natural for Nash to define a class of continuous incentive functions by
ϕNashiα (x) = (ui(eiα, x−i)− ui(x))+
where
(x)+ = max(0, x).
It is at this point where we are ready to define the updating protocol by which agents will
discreetly change their strategies. We define the map
T (x) : ×iRsi → ×iRsi
where
T (x)i =
xi +
∑
α ϕiα(x)eiα
1 +
∑
β ϕiβ(x)
.
It is easily verified that the sum of the coefficients of T (x)i is 1 if xi ∈ ∆i, however, if xiα = 0
we must have ϕiα(x) ≥ 0 in order to preserve the simplex. We also require
∑
β ϕiβ(x) 6= −1
for any x ∈ ×iRsi . This leads us to our definition of generalized incentive.
Definition 3. A function ϕ(x) : ×iRsi → ×iRsi is an incentive function if and only if it
satisfies both of the following conditions for all players i:
1. xiα = 0⇒ ϕiα(x) ≥ 0, ∀α
2.
∑
β ϕiβ(x) 6= −1 for any x ∈ ×iRsi .
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If we have a function defined as above we may simply refer to it as the incentive for the
game.
To complement our definition of incentive we must redefine equilibrium for the game to
account for the general incentive. First, we will produce conditions for the mapping T (x) to
have a fixed point.
0 = T (x)i − xi, ∀i (1)
=
xi +
∑
α ϕiα(x)eiα
1 +
∑
β ϕiβ(x)
− xi (2)
=
∑
α ϕiα(x)eiα − xi
∑
β ϕiβ(x)
1 +
∑
β ϕiβ(x)
(3)
⇔
∑
α
ϕiα(x)eiα = xi
∑
β
ϕiβ(x) (4)
⇔ ϕiα(x) = xiα
∑
β
ϕiβ(x), ∀i, α (5)
Note that at a fixed point, 4 says that ϕi is parallel to xi. Furthermore, ϕiα(x)/xiα equals
the total incentive provided that xiα 6= 0. If ϕiα(x) = 0 at a fixed point then either xiα = 0
or
∑
β ϕiβ(x) = 0, but xiα = 0⇒ ϕiα(x) = 0. An intuitive description of the concept is that
agents will achieve equilibrium if they either have no incentive or their incentives are in line
with their current strategy for the game. It is convenient to use the notation
ϕi(x)
xi
=
(
ϕi1(x)
xi1
, . . . ,
ϕisi(x)
xisi
)
with the convention that ϕiα(x) = 0⇒ ϕiα(x)
xiα
= 0.
Definition 4. A strategy profile xˆ is an incentive equilibrium if and only if
xˆi · ϕi(xˆ)
xˆi
= max
xi∈∆i
xi · ϕi(xˆ)
xˆi
, ∀i.
Note that if we maximize the right hand side of the equation with respect to xi under the
simplex constraint we must have ϕiα(xˆ)/xˆiα all equal wherever xˆiα 6= 0 and 0 elsewhere. The
left hand side is clearly
∑
β ϕiβ(xˆ). Therefore, T (xˆ) = xˆ⇔ xˆ is an incentive equilibrium.
The previous definition can be further simplified using identical arguments as in the
standard Nash equilibrium definition.
Definition 5. A strategy profile xˆ is an incentive equilibrium if and only if
xˆi · ϕi(xˆ)
xˆi
= max
α∈Si
ϕiα(xˆ)
xˆiα
, ∀i.
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From this definition it is clear that, as in the case of a Nash equilibrium, xˆiα = 0 whenever
ϕiα(xˆ)/xˆiα is not maximal.
The following lemma will be very useful for proving not only our main theorem that an
incentive equilibrium exists in every finite game, but will also allow us to identify equilibrium
points in games that have certain symmetries.
Lemma 1. If the incentive is continuous, a fixed point exists for T in any closed convex
U ⊂ ×iRsi that is left invariant by T .
Proof. Given the assumptions, T maps from U to U continuously and thus Brouwer’s fixed
point theorem guarantees the existence of a fixed point for T in U .
We now have all the tools necessary to prove the main theorem.
Theorem 2. If the incentive is continuous, an incentive equilibrium point xˆ exists for any
finite game.
Proof. We have defined the incentive functions such that the updating protocol T (x) defined
above is a continuous map from ∆ to ∆ and thus by our lemma, there exits an xˆ ∈ ∆ such
that T (xˆ) = xˆ. T (xˆ) = xˆ⇔ xˆ is an incentive equilibrium.
Other consequences of our lemma can also be obtained quite simply. For example, suppose
a two player game has the property that the incentive is continuous and ϕ1(x) = ϕ2(x) for
every x ∈ ∆ such that x1 = x2. The closed convex subset U = {x ∈ ∆|x1 = x2} is left
invariant by T and thus an incentive equilibrium point exists in U . We can generalize this
to symmetric n-player games. Denote the symmetric group on a finite set X as Sym(X).
Proposition 3. Suppose all players have the same pure strategy space, S1. Let U = {x ∈
∆|x1σi(α) = xiα, for some σi ∈ Sym(S1)}. If ϕ(x) is a continuous incentive and ϕ1σi(α)(x) =
ϕiα(x) for every x ∈ U , then an incentive equilibrium exists in U .
Proof. U is closed and convex. U is left invariant by T as
x′iα = Tiα(x) =
xiα + ϕiα(x)
1 +
∑
β ϕiβ(x)
=
x1σi(α) + ϕ1σi(α)(x)
1 +
∑
β ϕ1σi(β)(x)
= T1σi(α)(x)
= x′1σi(α)
Thus our lemma guarantees the existence of a fixed point of T in U which is a subset of ∆.
As a fixed point in ∆, it is also incentive equilibrium.
3 Examples
We will now discuss some specific examples of incentives.
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3.1 Canonical Examples
We will refer to a collection of incentives that have been well studied in other venues. They
are all very closely related to the Nash equilibrium. In fact they all share the property that
an interior Nash equilibrium is an incentive equilibrium.
3.1.1 Nash Incentive
Above it was noted that Nash defined a family of functions as
ϕNashiα (x) = (ui(eiα, x−i)− ui(x))+
for every player i and every strategy α ∈ Si. ϕNash(x) is trivially an incentive function as it
is non-negative in every component at every x ∈ ∆. Clearly this incentive is continuous as
f(x) = (x)+ and ui(x) are both continuous. Thus an incentive equilibrium exists for every
finite game.
We expect that the incentive equilibrium must in fact be a Nash equilibrium. If xˆ is a
Nash equilibrium, ϕ(xˆ) = 0 and thus every Nash equilibrium is an incentive equilibrium.
Conversely, if xˆ is an incentive equilibrium we have several possibilities. If
∑
β ϕ
Nash
iβ (xˆ) = 0,
xˆ is a Nash equilibrium. It suffices then to consider the case when the sum is positive. Also
we need not consider the case when xˆiα = 0 as this occurs if and only if ϕ
Nash
iα (xˆ) = 0.
Thus we can assume xˆiα > 0. This can occur in an incentive equilibrium if and only if
ϕNashiα (xˆ) > 0, which implies ui(eiα, xˆi) > ui(xˆ) for any α such that xˆiα > 0. For these α the
inequality, xˆiαui(eiα, xˆi) > xˆiαui(xˆ), must also hold. If we sum over these α we obtain the
impossible condition, ui(xˆ) > ui(xˆ). Thus at equilibrium ϕ
Nash(xˆ) = 0, which implies xˆ is a
Nash equilibrium.
3.1.2 Replicator Incentive
Interestingly, the replicator dynamics [TJ78], specifically the n-population models, given
by x˙iα = xiα(ui(eiα, x−i) − ui(x)), provide incentive functions as well. Define ϕRiα(x) =
xiα(ui(eiα, x−i)− ui(x)). ϕR(x) is an incentive function since
∑
β ϕ
R
iβ(x) = 0 and xiα = 0⇒
ϕRiβ(x) = 0. The replicator incentive function is not just continuous but analytic and thus
easily satisfies the condition for existence of incentive equilibrium.
The classification of these equilibrium points are quite easy given the total incentive is
identically zero. We must have all ϕRiα(xˆ) = 0 if xˆ is an incentive equilibrium. These functions
are zero in three cases; xˆiα = 0, xˆiα = 1, and ui(eiα, xˆ−i) = ui(xˆ). Thus in the interior of
∆ our equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium. In fact given the last condition all Nash equilibria
are replicator incentive equilibria. Finally, the first two conditions tell us that all x ∈ S are
equilibria in contrast to the Nash incentive.
We can actually use many different incentive functions to get the same behavior. The
simplest of these is ϕRiα(x) = xiαui(eiα, x−i). Notice that the total incentive
∑
β ϕ
R
iα(x) =
ui(x) for every x ∈ ∆, which could violate the second condition for an incentive function
if the utility for any player is ever −1. However, we can translate our payoffs by arbitrary
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functions gi(x) in every component for each player i. Thus ϕ
R
iα(x) = xiα(ui(eiα, x−i) + gi(x))
and
∑
α ϕ
R
iα(x) = ui(x)+gi(x). Furthermore, our equilibrium condition remains unchanged as
xiα(ui(eiα, x−i)+gi(x)) = xiα(ui(x)+gi(x)) is satisfied if xiα is 0 or 1, or if ui(eiα, x−i) = ui(x).
Thus in any finite game we can translate payoffs without changing equilibrium and every
finite game has a translated version where our function is a valid incentive. In only slight
contrast to the previous case the equilibria occurs when ϕRiα(xˆ) 6= 0. In general we can use
ϕRiα(x) = xiα(ui(eiα, x−i) + gi(x)) as our incentive function as long as g(x) translates each of
the minimum payoffs to any value greater than −1 (or maximum payoffs to values less than
−1).
3.1.3 Projection Incentive
The projection dynamic, originally introduced by Nagurney and Zhang[NZ96] and presented
in the style of Lahkar and Sandholm [LS08], is given by
x˙i = Fi(x),
where
Fi(x) =
(Ax)i −
1
|S(Ax,x)|
∑
j∈S(Ax,x)
(Ax)j if i ∈ S(Ax, x)
0 otherwise,
for a single population. S(Ax, x) is the set of all strategies in the support of x as well as any
collection of strategies that maximize the average presented in the first case above. Fi(x) is
clearly an incentive function for the game as
∑
i Fi(x) = 0 for every x ∈ ∆. When xi = 0,
i 6∈ supp(x) so Fi(x) = 0 or (Ax)i is part of a set that maximizes the average. In the second
case (Ax)i itself must be maximal and thus Fi(x) = 0.
It is shown in Sandholm, Dokumaci, and Lahkar [SDL08] that the replicator dynamics
and the projection dynamics share many features. Most important in this discussion are
the interior equilibria, which they showed to be Nash equilibria just as is the case for the
replicator incentive. However, in this case the discontinuity at the boundary means the main
theorem does not apply.
3.1.4 Best Reply
The best reply incentive is quite easy to understand. It was originally introduced by Gilboa
and Matsui [GM91]. Nash defined a function B(x) in his original proof of existence, which
is a set valued function that returns all of the pure strategy best replies to the strategy x.
For our purposes we will use the function used by Young [You01], where
BRiα(x) =
{
1 if eiα ∈ B(x)
0 otherwise.
To make this a function, there is a tiebreaker assumed so that only one pure strategy is taken
to be the best reply. This function is a valid incentive since BRiα(x) ≥ 0 and
∑
αBRiα(x) =
7
1 for every x ∈ ∆. The main theorem does not apply directly, however the incentive equilibria
for this are exactly Nash equilibria. Thus the existence of a Nash equilibrium in all finite
games guarantees the existence of an incentive equilibrium for the best reply incentive.
3.1.5 Logit Incentive
The logit incentive was originally introduced as a smoothed version of best reply by Fuden-
berg and Levine [FL98]. The incentive is defined as
ϕLiα(x) =
exp(η−1u(eiα, x−i))∑
β exp(η
−1u(eiβ, x−i))
and is obviously a valid incentive function since ϕLiα(x) > 0 for every x and
∑
β ϕ
L
iβ(x) = 1.
The incentive is continuous and thus the main theorem applies. The incentive equilibria are
exactly the fixed points of ϕL(x).
It should be noted that as η → 0 the incentive converges to the best reply incentive. On
the other end of the spectrum as η → ∞ this incentive approaches the zero incentive (see
below). The variable η is thought of as ‘noise’, and is essentially a measure of error in logic,
much like the  in the -equilibrium (see below).
3.1.6 Smith Incentive
The Smith incentive was developed by Micheal J. Smith [Smi84] to describe traffic flows. He
suggests as a reasonable assumption that the rate which drivers swap from one route, β, to
another route, α, is given by the proportion of drivers on route β times any additional cost
of using β over α. Thus we can interpret this as an incentive to switch to α as
ϕSiα(x) =
∑
γ
xiγ(ui(eiγ, x−i)− ui(eiα, x−i))+
where Smith would drop the i as there is only a single population of drivers.
The above function is always non-negative and thus is a valid incentive function. It is
also obviously continuous thus the main theorem applies. Any Nash equilibrium, x, is an
incentive equilibrium as xiα > 0⇔ ui(eiα, x−i) = maxγui(eiγ, x−i) and thus the terms in the
above sum are all zero. The converse however is not generally true. The set of incentive
equilibria in this case is called Wardrop equilibria [War52].
3.2 Other Examples
We can also describe a number of non-canonical examples which may be of interest.
3.2.1 The Zero Incentive
The trivial, or zero, incentive is given by ϕ(x) = 0 for all x ∈ ∆. The function is clearly
a valid incentive and also trivially satisfies the conditions for the existence of an incentive
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equilibrium. This of course is not surprising as the zero incentive fixes every point in ∆, and
thus all points are incentive equilibria. If only one agent uses the zero incentive to update,
it would appear to the opposition that the agent is choosing at random. In fact all elements
of ∆i are equally likely under this incentive.
3.2.2 Epsilon-Nash Incentive
-Nash equilibria was first introduced by Everett [Eve57].
Definition 6. For a fixed  > 0, x ∈ ∆ is an -equilibrium if and only if
ui(x) ≥ ui(ti, x−i)−  ∀ti ∈ ∆i, i.
We can make a similar simplification to what we did for the Nash equilibrium. Instead
of checking every xi ∈ ∆i it suffices to check only those strategies in Si. We can therefore
use the incentive function
ϕiα(x) = (ui(eiα, x−i)− ui(x)− )+.
This is clearly an incentive as it is always non-negative. It is also continuous which ensures
the existence of incentive equilibrium. Of course, we already know that a Nash equilibrium
exists in all finite games and a Nash equilibrium is an -equilibrium for every  > 0.
There are simple examples of games that are repeated indefinitely which do not have
Nash equilibria, but do still have -equilibria for some  > 0. While this is beyond the
scope of this discussion it is worth mentioning. Within our scope are the finitely repeated
prisoner’s dilemmas. In these games it can be shown that the strategies tit-for-tat [AH81]
and grim trigger are -equilibria for some positive  which depends on the payoffs of the one
shot games.
3.2.3 Simultaneous Updating
While the notion of the -equilibrium is very useful, it adds a degree of freedom to the
problem of finding equilibria.  would have to be fit to data in order to make the model
viable and must be changed for each new game.
We draw inspiration for a new model from Brams’ “Theory of Moves” [Bra94]. In his book
he describes a solution concept for 2× 2 games that is based on a hypothetical negotiation.
It is assumed that the agents begin this negotiation at a point in S, then each player does a
hypothetical check on what would happen if they moved to their alternative pure strategy.
They assume the other player will also switch and this alternating changing of strategy
continues until a cycle is complete1. Then the agent, using backward induction on the cycle,
decides whether or not to make the first move. The solutions are the collection of possible
outcomes given the 4 possible starting positions, giving this the feel of a discrete dynamical
system.
1This procedure always takes four moves, as the last move by the opposition returns the negotiation to
its original state
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We define an incentive function that takes into account the other players’ possible reac-
tions to an agent’s move. We notice that if all agents are updating simultaneously then we
can be anywhere in ∆. Recall that all of the utility functions are maximized (and minimized)
in S, so we will only make comparisons on the boundary. Our incentive is defined as
ϕSUiα (x) =
∑
γ
(aiαγ − ui(x))+ (6)
=
∑
γ
(ui(eiα, x−i)− ui(x) + aiαγ − ui(eiα, x−i))+. (7)
The function is a valid incentive since it is always non-negative, and is continuous which
means an incentive equilibrium exists for all finite games. The incentive equilibria for ϕSU(x)
that lie in S are very easily classified: they must be win-win situations in the sense that all
players are achieving their maximum payoffs in the game.
We can further generalize this approach by adding a strategic component. The incentive
ϕSSUiα (x) =
∑
γ
δiαγ(x)(aiαγ − ui(x))+,
with δiαγ(x) = 1 if there exists at least one other player who would benefit from player i
changing to strategy α, and 0 otherwise. The function δ(x) could be redefined to ensure
any collection of players, including N , and thus could be used to describe cooperative game
play. While these are valid incentives, they are not generally continuous. It could be possible
to produce a smooth approximation using methods similar to those that created the logit
incentive from the best reply.
3.2.4 Altruism
Altruism is a behavior exemplified by helping others without regard to personal benefit. To
that end, an incentive can be described easily to fit this description.
ϕAiα(x) =
(
min
j 6=i
(uj(eiα, x−i)− uj(x)))
)
+
This is clearly a valid, continuous incentive and thus the main theorem applies.
3.2.5 Pareto Improvements and Coalitions
Pareto improvements are characterized by the players in the game making changes in a
direction in which all players’ utilities increase. This is very similar to altruism with the
main difference being now that each player must also be concerned with its own success as
well as the group. Furthermore, we must note that direction should be interpreted as one of
the unit vectors pi ∈ S. We may write pi = (eiα, e−iβ), where β ∈ S−i or pi = (α, β), taking
full advantage of our multiindex, unit vector identification.
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For these intents, the incentive
ϕPIiα (x) =
∑
β
(aiαβ − ui(x))+
∏
j 6=i
(
ajβjpi−j − uj(x)
)
+
=
∑
pi|pii=α
∏
j
(ajpi − uj(x))+
suits the purpose. If any one player does not gain from a move in direction pi, then the product
will be zero for every player in that direction. Otherwise, all players have the same incentive
to change to their individual strategy that will achieve pi. The existence theorem can be
applied as continuity and the boundary condition are again trivially satisfied. Unfortunately,
there are large collections of games with all strategies as incentive equilibrium. Zero sum
games are a subset of this family as all strategies are pareto optimal in the sense that no
pareto improvements can ever be made.
This incentive will mimic the actions of the grand coalition where utilities are non-
transferable. We can also define a more general incentive that can account for any additional
coalition forming behavior. If we denote the power set of the finite set N as P(N), then
ϕCiα(x) =
∑
pi
pii=α
∑
Ω∈P(N)
i∈Ω
∏
j∈Ω
(ajpi − uj(x))+
will collect any excess payoffs associated with forming any possible coalition with the other
players. It retains continuity and the necessary boundary condition and thus incentive
equilibrium of this sort also exist for all finite games.
3.2.6 Margin of Victory and Rivalry
While the topic of rational game play has been discussed at length, the more general notion
of victory has largely been ignored in the literature. A reasonable interpretation for a player
winning a game would be to outscore the opposition. To this end the following incentive,
ϕMViα (x) =
(
ui(eiα, x−i)−max
j 6=i
uj(eiα, x−i)
)
+
will always be positive for any alternative that makes its own payoff larger than any other
agent’s. Continuity is ensured, thus equilibrium of this sort will exist in any finite game.
A similar concept is that of a rival. Presented here are two incentives based on the notions
of hurting a rival and increasing the margin of victory over a specific rival, respectively.
ϕRivaliα (x) =
(
uσ(i)(x)− uσ(i)(eiα, x−i)
)
+
ϕMVRiα (x) =
(
ui(eiα, x−i)− uσ(i)(eiα, x−i)
)
+
In this context, σ ∈ Sym(N) which fixes no index2. Both are continuous, valid incentives.
2It would seem akward to have a player be its own rival.
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4 Game Dynamics
The emergence of the replicator equations of Taylor and Jonker [TJ78] has created a re-
newed interest in dynamic models of rational decision making. There are several examples
of these sorts of models including, but not limited to, the logit equation [FL98], best reply
dynamics [GM91], the Brown-von Neumann-Nash (BNN) equations [BvN59], projection dy-
namics [NZ96, SDL08], Smith dynamics [Smi84], and others. Sandholm [San10] derives a
family of differential equations, referred to as mean dynamics, given by
x˙i =
∑
j∈S
xjρji(u(x), x)− xi
∑
j∈S
ρij(u(x), x)
to describe the inflow and outflow of agents to and from a type i within a single population.
The ρij are supposed to represent the conditional switch rate of an agent switching from
type i to type j. If one were to specify this probability appropriately then one can recover
all of the canonical dynamics listed above.
We seek a similarly flexible model but with incentive as the governing concept. We
will proceed in such a way as to derive the BNN equations as introduced by Brown and
von Neumann. As we have seen we can describe general equilibrium in games by way of
incentive functions. We then allow agents to update their strategies via a revision protocol,
T (x) given by
Ti(x) =
xi +
∑
α ϕiα(x)eiα
1 +
∑
β ϕiβ(x)
.
If we repeat this mapping we can think of it as a discrete time dynamical system defined
recursively by xt = T (xt−1), where the superscript here is to denote the time step and not
an exponent.
4.1 Incentive Dynamics
Instead of working with the discrete time system above, we prefer to work with a continu-
ous time differential equation if possible. To facilitate this endeavor we will redefine every
incentive function to have a simple time dependence. That is
ϕ˜(x) := tϕ(x).
However, any change to the incentive function must also have an effect on the revision
protocol, thus we write
x′i = Ti(x, t) :=
xi +
∑
α ϕ˜iα(x)eiα
1 +
∑
β ϕ˜iβ(x)
=
xi + t
∑
α ϕiα(x)eiα
1 + t
∑
β ϕiβ(x)
.
12
Furthermore, it is now possible to define the time derivative of xi.
x˙i := lim
t→0
x′i − xi
t
= lim
t→0
xi + t
∑
α ϕiα(x)eiα − xi − txi
∑
β ϕiβ(x)
t+ t2
∑
β ϕiβ(x)
= lim
t→0
∑
α ϕiα(x)eiα − xi
∑
β ϕiβ(x)
1 + t
∑
β ϕiβ(x)
=
∑
α
ϕiα(x)eiα − xi
∑
β
ϕiβ(x)
In individual coordinates we can write our family of differential equations as
x˙iα = ϕiα − xiα
∑
β
ϕiβ(x).
We will refer to this family of equations as incentive dynamics.
It should be clear that fixed points of this family of differential equations are exactly
incentive equilibria. As a consequence we have a number of incentive dynamics we can
already describe rather easily. First we note that if we allow the incentive to be given as
Nash originally conceived, ϕ(x) = ϕNash(x), then we recover the BNN equations as one
would naturally expect.
We note that in the special case when
∑
β ϕiβ(x) = 0 for every x ∈ ∆, the incentive
dynamics reduce to simply x˙iα = ϕiα(x). The n-population replicator equations are given
by
ϕRiα(x) = xiα(ui(eα, x−i)− ui(x))
simply by recognizing that this incentive fits this special case. We have previously noted that
there are many incentives that have the same equilibria as the replicator incentive above.
These were given by ϕRiα(x) = xiα(ui(eα, x−i) + gi(x)) where g(x) is an arbitrary function
from ∆ to Rn. We derive the replicator equations as follows
x˙iα = ϕ
R
iα(x)− xiα
∑
β
ϕRiβ(x)
= xiα(ui(eα, x−i) + gi(x))− xiα
∑
β
xiβ(ui(eβ, x−i) + gi(x))
= xiαui(eα, x−i) + xiαgi(x)− xiα
∑
β
xiβui(eβ, x−i)− xiα
∑
β
xiβgi(x)
= xiαui(eα, x−i) + xiαgi(x)− xiαgi(x)− xiαui(x)
= xiα(ui(eα, x−i)− ui(x))
Furthermore, we can recover all possible mean dynamics by defining the incentive
ϕMi (x) =
∑
j∈S
xjρji(u(x), x).
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Incentive, ϕiα(x) Incentive Dynamic Name
(Source)
0 x˙iα = 0 Zero In-
centive
xiα(ui(eiα, x−i) + gi(x)) x˙iα = xiα(ui(eiα, x−i)− ui(x)) Replicator
[TJ78]
(ui(eiα, x−i)− ui(x))+ x˙iα= ui(eiα, x−i)− ui(x))+−xiα
∑
β(ui(eiβ, x−i)− ui(x))+ BNN[BvN59]
BRiα(x) x˙iα = BRiα(x)− xiα Best Reply
[You01]
exp(η−1u(eiα, x−i))∑
β exp(η
−1u(eiβ, x−i))
x˙iα =
exp(η−1u(eiα, x−i))∑
β exp(η
−1u(eiβ, x−i))
− xiα Logit
[FL98]∑
γxiγ(ui(eiγ, x−i)
−ui(eiα, x−i))+
xiα=
∑
γ xiγ(ui(eiγ, x−i)− ui(eiα, x−i))+
−xiα
∑
β
∑
γ xiγ(ui(eiγ, x−i)− ui(eiβ, x−i))+
Smith
[Smi84]
Table 1: Incentives for canonical dynamics
The probability of switching from strategy i to j is given by ρij(u(x), x)/R, where R is
constant. Thus
∑
j∈S ρij(u(x), x) = R for any i. Hence ϕ
M(x) induces the mean dynamics
as follows,
x˙i = ϕ
M
i (x)− xi
∑
j∈S
ϕMj (x)
=
∑
j∈S
xjρji(u(x), x)− xi
∑
j∈S
∑
i∈S
xiρij(u(x), x)
=
∑
j∈S
xjρji(u(x), x)− xi
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈S
xiρij(u(x), x)
=
∑
j∈S
xjρji(u(x), x)− xi
∑
i∈S
xi
∑
j∈S
ρij(u(x), x)
=
∑
j∈S
xjρji(u(x), x)− xi
∑
j∈S
ρij(u(x), x).
4.2 Generality
It has been mentioned that there are other dynamical system models for game play. We
would then like to know if the model presented here is in fact fully general in the sense
that we can achieve all possible game dynamics with an appropriate choice of incentive. In
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general a game dynamic will have the form
x˙iα = Fiα(x)
where we require Fiα(x) to preserve the simplex. Therefore, we must have
∑
α Fiα(x) = 0
for every x ∈ ∆ and i ∈ N . Also, we must have Fiα(x) ≥ 0 if xiα = 0. These conditions
make F (x) an incentive function by our definition and our incentive dynamics are exactly
x˙iα = Fiα(x). Therefore, we can recover any valid game dynamic by an appropriate choice
of incentive. As noted above, the incentives that generate a specific dynamic need not be
unique. In fact, any valid incentive, ϕ(x), has a dynamically equivalent incentive, ϕ˜iα(x) =
ϕiα(x) − xiα
∑
β ϕiβ(x), with the property,
∑
α ϕ˜iα(x) = 0. This allows us to drop the
restriction on incentives that
∑
α ϕiα(x) 6= −1 as behavior on the boundary is the only
requirement that must be retained.
Definition 7 (Incentive). A function ϕ(x) : ×iRsi → ×iRsi is an incentive function if and
only if it satisfies xiα = 0⇒ ϕiα(x) ≥ 0, ∀α.
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